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Abstract: This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost 
unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good 
should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article 
different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a trade-
off between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as 
shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties’ incentives. Specifically, it 
is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights 
Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset 
will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in 
order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights.  
 
 
JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 
 
Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theory 
 
                                                 
*Associate Professor, Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics and Management, 
Porcelænshaven 24 . DK-2000 Frederiksberg. E-mail car.intr.ckk@cbs.dk. Phone. (0045) 38 15 28 51.  The paper 
benefited from presentation at the ALEA fifteenth annual meeting in New York, May 6, 2005, especially from the 
valuable comments of Eric Rasmusen. The paper also benefited much from presentation at the EALE annual conference 
held in Ljubljana, September 15, 2005. I thank Antony Dness, Göran Skogh, Kristoffel Grechenig, Nick van der Beek, 





Imagine a situation where a person has just purchased a good from a seller only to be confronted by 
another person demanding that the good be handed over, arguing that she is the rightful owner of 
the good and that a thief had just stolen it. The basic question is whether a buyer should be allowed 
to keep the good or not, assuming that the purchase was made in good faith i.e. the buyer assumed 
the seller was the rightful owner of the good. Moreover, the problem deals with the conditions 
under which the initial owner can contest the validity of the deal between a purchaser and a thief.  
The situation is identical to the case where the initial owner contracts with a buyer and afterwards 
resells the same good to another buyer, although this article focuses on the former case.  
To illustrate, the Danish police recently accused one of the most famous soccer players in Denmark 
of handling stolen goods. He had bought a beautiful luxury watch on the busiest shopping street in 
Copenhagen (called Strøget) for 2,500 Danish crowns. A few days later he was being interviewed 
on national TV by a sports reporter when a viewer suddenly recognized the watch he was wearing 
as his own recently stolen one. He immediately contacted the police and was able to prove his 
ownership. The soccer player claimed in court that he thought the watch was a copy and was 
unaware of the fact that the watch was much more valuable than the price he had paid for it (the 
watch had a value of 150,000 Danish crowns), which was rejected by the court.  
The term rei vindicatio stems from Roman law and describes an owner’s right to claim his good 
back from a person who unlawfully has the good in his possession. Natural law or jus naturale was 
the dominant legal foundation for the majority of European countries that coincide with Roman 
law1. The rule was an absolute doctrine of vindication, which was regarded as an inherent attribute 
embedded in the notion of property rights at that time.   
                                                 
1 The Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius is regarded as the founder of the rationalistic natural law c.f. his work on the 
law of peace and war entitled “De jure belli ac pacis libri tres” (1625). 
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Different legal systems prescribe various solutions to this fundamental problem of property rights. 
Some legal systems place the entire risk on the buyer, whereas other systems place the risk on the 
initial owner. However, as this article shows, the choice of legal rule has important economic 
consequences and thus influences parties’ incentives differently. 
A person who is offered a television in the parking lot outside a bar is rarely in doubt that the 
television is stolen. In other situations, a person may find it difficult to determine the likelihood that 
the offered good is stolen. This is the case when used goods are offered for sale outside private 
homes (garage sales) or sold through pawn shops. In fact, most stolen goods are traded in 
workplaces where many people interact and rarely in sinister places. In some situations, a person 
may even place an order announcing his interest in a particular good, e.g. in a designer 
manufactured good or a rare cultural artifact.  
Moreover, the problem of who should be the rightful owner does not only pertain to small private 
transactions, but also to large international transactions involving government agencies and private 
organizations. For instance, famous accredited museums in the Western world arrange exhibitions 
of foreign cultural artifacts. In many cases, the original country seeks to have the cultural artifacts 
returned, claiming that they are part of the country’s national heritage and that they have been 
stolen or transported illegally abroad. Whether the museums are acting in good faith is difficult to 
assess for certain, but the choice of legal rule obviously raises some important cultural and financial 
aspects. For instance, should a country of origin receive some kind of compensation, and if so, how 
does one determine a just compensation in the absence of a market for such goods. The problem is 
complicated by the fact that the appropriate choice of law needs to be solved first. Besides these 
legal aspects, there is considerable political pressure from powerful interest groups that may try to 
influence the public debate on this question.  
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Another possibility is for a thief to sell the stolen goods through an auction, particularly if the 
auction house does not require that the ownership be documented, which is the case for some 
auction houses on the Internet. To illustrate, the Danish police had recently solved a case where 
very rare five-hundred-year-old Danish books were stolen from the Danish Royal Library. They 
were stolen by a former employee at the library who sold the books abroad at different auctions in 
Germany and the UK (Sweden has just experienced a rather similar case). The police are currently 
trying to track down the rare books, but have faced severe juridical as well as practical difficulties 
in seeking to repossess the books.  
The problem does not only relate to the law of property rights but also to criminal law, since in 
almost all jurisdictions a person handling stolen goods is criminally liable. Therefore, one needs to 
take this fact explicitly into consideration, because a potential buyer is concerned not only about the 
risk of having to hand the good back to the original owner, but also about the expected punishment 
from a criminal court. Alternatively, instead of having a separate criminal article for handling stolen 
goods, the buyer might be charged with complicit participation. The reason for punishing a buyer 
who knows (or should have known) that the good is stolen is that legislature seeks to impede the 
distribution of stolen goods and thereby the aggregate number of thefts in the economy. The aim is 
to restrict such transactions to the black market, where trade is more risky. 
Furthermore, the choice of legal rule also affects people’s incentives to protect their property, e.g. 
through buying private security services (see Benson and Mast (2001) for a study of the effects of 
privately produced general deterrence). One would expect that in jurisdictions where the law allows 
a buyer to keep an asset given a buyer’s good faith, property owners’ expenditures for protecting 
their property would increase. It is a well-known fact that private expenditures on crime reduction 
may generate externalities (see e.g. Ayres and Levitt (1996), although there is no guarantee that the 
rule mentioned coincides with the socially optimal level of private security. On the other hand, a 
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rule that places the risk on the buyer provides potential buyers with incentives to investigate and 
verify the ownership of a particular asset. Skogh and Stuart (1982) analyze crime rates, punishment 
and the social consequences of crime. They show that the social aggregate crime committed, total 
punishment and the total costs of crime in terms of resources do not necessarily have a 
straightforward relation to the extent of criminal justice. This implies that the optimal amount of 
crime prevention cannot in general be determined by a simple examination of the total or marginal 
amount of crime committed or punishment meted out. 
This article formulates a game theoretical model analyzing how a rule of law that allows a buyer in 
good faith to keep the good influences parties’ incentives compared to a regime where good faith 
does not protect the interests of a buyer. It is shown that incorporating good faith into the analysis 
significantly influences the incentives of an initial owner to protect his property as well as how 
much a potential buyer is willing to spend on verifying ownership. It is shown that the aggregate 
number of thefts is higher under the latter rule of law, where good faith is crucial, compared to a 
rule of law where good faith is irrelevant. More specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where 
good faith is Pareto irrelevant dominates a rule of law with good faith, since an owner under the 
latter rule spends more resources on protecting her property and thus provides a potential buyer 
with incentives to verify ownership. The article also describes how various jurisdictions deal with 
this issue of determining property rights, including a description of how the principle of good faith 
is modified in different ways in diverse jurisdictions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief literature review is presented and in Section 
3, a short overview of different jurisdictions around the world is presented concerning the 
conditions under which a buyer is entitled to keep a good. In Section 4, a formal game theoretical 
model is formulated, where the issue of good faith is explicitly incorporated. This is followed by a 
discussion in Section 5. The article ends with a conclusion in Section 6.  
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2. Literature 
Law and economics literature on this interesting issue seems to be rather scarce. Cooter and Ulen, 
however, (2000) stand out as an exception. Cooter and Ulen argue that one may distinguish between 
a so-called American rule and a European rule; the former protects the buyer whereas the latter 
places the risk on the initial owner, as a buyer in good faith is entitled to keep the good.  
They present an appealing and simple approach arguing that efficiency requires one to compare the 
lowest costs to the original owner of protecting against theft relative to the lowest cost to the 
purchaser of verifying whether a seller is indeed the rightful owner. If the costs of the former 
exceed the latter, it is more efficient for a good faith buyer to acquire good title against the original 
owner and vice versa. However, this straightforward approach ignores the strategic interaction 
between the parties involved that is typically embedded in such a situation. To elaborate, if a person 
who is offered a good for sale observes that the apparent owner of the property has spent a 
considerable amount on protecting his property, she is less likely to anticipate that the good is 
stolen. In addition, there is no empirical evidence of these values to leave room for a deeper 
analysis of the situation.   
In Posner and Landes’ (1996) analysis of the economics of art and other collectibles they study the 
consequences of good faith in terms of allowing an owner of a piece of art to find the thief with 
some probability. They define good faith as “one who having made the optimal investment in 
obtaining information about the title of the work prior to purchase, believes that there is a very high 
probability that the seller can transfer good title to him”. One of their findings is that the more rights 
the original owner has against the purchaser of a stolen work (even though many transactions may 
separate the purchaser from the thief), the lower will be the price at which a thief can sell a work of 
art, thus reducing the incentive for art theft. However, as they mention, the incentive of the owner to 
protect his property against theft will also be lower, which will reduce the costs of stealing to the 
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thief. They argue that the analysis of optimal legal rules is complicated and claim that there is surely 
room for additional economic analysis. Contrary to the model constructed by Posner and Landes 
(1996), a game theoretical model may permit careful study of the strategic interdependency among 
the involved persons.  
Levmore (1987) conducts a comparative legal examination of the conflict between the original 
owner and the good faith purchaser of stolen property. The legal survey does not only cover 
common law but also contains a description of some rather exotic ancient jurisdictions. For 
instance, the Code of Hammurabi addresses the problem of innocent possession of stolen goods, 
stating in “§ 281. If they are children of another land, the purchaser shall take oath before God as to 
the silver he has paid; and the owner of the slave, male or female, shall give to the trader the silver 
he has paid; and shall recover his male or female slave”. Levmore (1987) notices that it is uncertain 
whether the rule of § 281 extended to property other than slaves, but the system of Hammurabi was 
the only ancient legal system known to contemplate the unavailability of the thief. The post-biblical 
Jewish law formed by the rule of Exodus prescribes that once an owner is regarded as having 
despaired of recovering lost (including stolen) property, he is taken to have legally renounced title. 
Some rules of societies far removed from the path of Western civilization are also described, 
including Mongolian Tribal Law. Specifically, in the Mongolo-Oirat Regulations of 1640, the 
“owner of stray cattle has the right to retake them (in the presence of reliable witnesses); but if the 
cattle is in the hands of a bona fide third person who bought them, the original owner of the cattle is 
entitled only to the herd - the better part of the cattle- and the one who bought them to the rump – 
the inferior part”. Levmore (1987) argues that the differences in the treatment of the good faith 
purchaser found across different legal systems support the thesis that one source of variety is 
uncertainty, or reasonable disagreement, about the behavioral effects of alternative legal rules.   
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Ben-Shahar and Harel (1995) focus on the problem of synchronizing the efforts of governments and 
victims to reach the optimal combined enforcement, since the victims’ incentives to take 
precautions usually diverge from what is optimal. The policy implication of their model is that in 
order to “correct” the victims’ incentives, an incentive mechanism can be used in criminal law 
which they label a “contributory fault”, i.e. a victim who fails to take the socially optimal level of 
precaution loses some of the publicly provided protection. Their analysis suggests that some 
criminal law doctrines can be illuminated by the contributory fault idea.  
Eric Rasmusen (2004) addresses issues that arise in agency law when agents make contracts on 
behalf of principals. The main issue is whether the principal should be bound when the agent makes 
a contract with some third party on his behalf that the principal would immediately wish to 
disavow. The resulting trade-offs resemble those in tort law, so the least-cost- avoider principle is 
useful for deciding when contracts are valid and may be the underlying logic behind a number of 
different legal doctrines applied to agency cases. In particular, an efficiency explanation can be 
found for the undisclosed principal rule, which says that the principal is generally bound even when 
the third party is unaware that the agent is acting as an agent for him. 
 
Rule of law in selected jurisdictions 
As mentioned, various legal systems solve this problem of property rights differently. Jurisdictions 
that protect the buyer emphasize the importance of promoting trade among independent parties, 
whereas jurisdictions that protect the initial owner regardless of the good faith of the buyer are 
concerned exclusively with property rights in society. However, if one considers the law in several 
continental European countries as well as in common law countries, the classification offered by 
Cooter and Ulen (2000) seems to be modified, as it is dubious whether one may talk about an 
American or European regime of law as such.  
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Under English law a purchaser acquires good title not only when the seller has voidable title or is an 
entrustee selected by the original owner, but also when the buyer was in a market overt, c.f. Sale of 
Goods Act §§ 23-24. This implies that a buyer avoids the risk of repossession by patronizing any 
shop in London or a market elsewhere. On the contrary, in American law an owner may recover the 
stolen property, c.f. Restatement (second) of Restitution § 45. Since a thief never acquires title an 
innocent buyer always loses to the owner but it is possible for a disappointed buyer to recover the 
good from the seller who breached an implied warranty of title, provided that the seller is not 
judgment proof c.f. U.C.C. § 2-312. However, when property is not stolen but is separated from its 
original owner by fraud, misrepresentation or duress, c.f. U.C.C. § 2-403 title passes to the 
misbehaving vendee, as the vendee’s title is said to be “voidable” (see Levmore (1987) for a more 
thorough legal analysis).   
In German law, it is not possible to acquire property of a stolen good, even if a buyer (as well as the 
seller) is in good faith. Paragraph 932 I of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) formulates the 
general rule that one can acquire property by buying a piece of personal property, even if the seller 
is not the owner of the good, i.e. when the buyer is in good faith (and his ignorance is not caused by 
gross negligence, c.f. paragraph 932 II BGB). However, paragraph 935 I states an exception to the 
general rule of paragraph 932 I, namely that one cannot acquire title to a piece of personal property 
if this piece has been stolen or lost. The decisive factor is obviously that the former owner must 
have lost control over his property in a conscious and voluntary way in order to allow another 
person to acquire title to that property. But paragraph 935 I in BGB, together with an exception 
stated in subsection II, mentions some situations where one can become the rightful owner of a 
stolen or lost good when one is in good faith, namely in cases of money, bearer papers or goods that 
have been bought at a public auction. 
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In Austrian law, § 367 of the Austrian Private Law Code (ABGB) regulates this issue as follows:  
If the buyer was (1) bona fide regarding the ownership of the seller and if the good was sold (2.1) at 
a public auction or (2.2.) by a businessman who had a license to trade in the good sold or (2.3) the 
seller was a confidant (e.g. the owner lent the good to the person who then sold it), the buyer can 
keep the good she has bought. The first two cases also apply to stolen goods, whereas the third does 
not. If the seller is a merchant, then § 366 of the Austrian Commercial Code (HGB) applies and the 
buyer cannot keep stolen goods (§ 366 paragraph 4 HGB). However, the law makes exceptions to 
this and the commercial law is fundamentally very similar to the general provisions of § 367 
ABGB.  
In Dutch law, the relevant articles are 3:84 and 3:86 in the Civil Code. In general, transfer of 
ownership requires a title (a reason for the transfer, e.g. sale), authority of the person transferring 
the property i.e. a right to transfer the ownership of the rights to that good, as well as delivery 
(which can, for example, be accomplished by keeping the good in what is called constitutum 
possessorium or c.p.).  
If a good is delivered c.p., someone who has an older right (like the original owner in our case) can 
ignore the delivery. Thus from the viewpoint of that person (and only that person) the delivery 
never took place. If a person wants to transfer a moveable non-registered good that the person does 
not own (like a stolen TV), he lacks the required authority. Normally the party seeking to acquire 
ownership is not granted it. There is an exception to this rule: if the good is received for a counter 
performance and the buyer acted in good faith, the lack of authority is repaired (assuming that the 
other requirements are satisfied) and ownership is transferred. This is the Dutch rule for all 
moveable non-registered goods and all situations in which the authority is missing. In the case of 
theft, there is a further exception in which an owner can claim back his stolen property within a 
period of three years after the good is stolen, regardless of whether or not the receiver acted in good 
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faith. Furthermore, there are two more exceptions to this exception to an exception. First, rights to 
paper (e.g. money and shares) are not included in the exception. Second, if a natural person (not a 
legal entity) who did not receive the good for his profession receives the ownership of the good 
from someone selling the good as his normal profession (except an auctioneer) in a building 
intended to be used for such a profession, the original owner cannot claim his property.  To 
illustrate, a person who buys a stolen caravan in good faith from someone who sells caravans from a 
piece of grassland, where one caravan is permanently installed and used as an office, can keep the 
caravan.  
Concerning non domini acquisition in Slovenian law, article 64 in the Slovenian Property Law Code 
regulates this issue. Ownership of a movable good is acquired even if the transferor did not have the 
right to dispose of the good, provided that the acquirer was in good faith at the moment of delivery 
and acquired the good on the basis of an onerous legal transaction. Ownership is acquired in this 
manner only if the movable good was sold at a public auction, if the transferor put such movables 
into circulation as part of his activity or if the transferor acquired possession of the movable by will 
of its owner. Within one year of the extinguishment of ownership the previous owner may demand 
that the acquirer sell the movable to him at the market price if it has a special importance for him. 
The rule is an exception to the general principle that nobody can dispose of rights that do not belong 
to him: nemo plus iuris transfere potest quam ipso habet. Acqusition by prescription is covered in 
the Slovenian Property Law Article 43. A proprietary possessor of movable property in good faith 
acquires ownership of it after three years. A proprietary possessor of immovable property in good 
faith acquires ownership of it after ten years.  
Concerning Italian law in this particular case, where the goods are stolen, one needs to make the 
following distinctions: the requirements for becoming the proprietor of mobile goods are the 
buyer’s good faith and possession, c.f. art. 1153 and art. 1161 in the Italian Civil Code, or, if the 
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purchase was not made in good faith, twenty years of possession (c.f. art. 1161). Regarding goods 
that are mobile as well as registered in a public official system (e.g. a car), the conditions are the 
buyer’s good faith and registration plus three years of possession, c.f. art. 1162, or, if the purchase 
was not made in good faith, twenty years of possession (c.f. art. 1161). Finally, concerning things 
that are not mobile (e.g. a house), the requirements are the same as in the former case, but the 
number of years of possession is extended to ten years in the case of good faith, c.f. art. 1159. and 
twenty years when good faith is absent (c.f. art. 1158). In addition, there is a special regime in 
Italian law for universalitas rerum (referring to certain things that are owned by one person and 
ought to be considered as a unity, e.g. a flock of goats) together with a complex system to resolve 
litigation between buyers who both registered their contract in the case of registered goods bought 
from different persons, e.g. a thief and the legitimate owner. 
In French Law, the problem is considered an excuse to void a contract due to fraud denoted “Dolus” 
(the other types are mistake and duress). The case will be considered as fraud under article 1116 of 
the Civil Code, since the thief deliberately hides the fact that the good is stolen when he contracts. 
French law (case law) makes a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental fraud, and in 
this case it is regarded as fundamental fraud, because the buyer would never enter into this contract 
if he knew that the good was stolen. As a consequence, the contract is voided. But more 
importantly, the initial owner is entitled to keep the good despite the good faith of the buyer. The 
only thing the buyer can do is to claim damages for any amount paid for the good and any 
additional losses from the thief. 
In Spain, if a thief steals a good from a household and sells it to a merchant, the household is 
entitled to keep the good, whereas if a thief steels the good from a merchant and sells it to another 
merchant or household, the buyer is entitled to keep the good given good faith. 
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In Swedish law, the situation is governed by law (c.f. Law No. 796 of 1986, Om godtrosförvärv av 
lösöre). In paragraph 4, I, it is stated that when someone has lost his property (including by theft) 
and the buyer is in good faith, the initial owner is entitled to receive the good in exchange for 
compensation to the buyer. Paragraph 4, 2 states that the initial owner is only entitled to claim the 
good back within a period of three months from the time he knew or should have known that the 
buyer was in possession of the good. 
In Danish law, the situation is determined by case law, which gives the initial owner the property 
rights to the good regardless of a buyer’s good faith. However, under very special circumstances, a 
buyer is entitled to keep the good provided that four conditions are all satisfied. First, the good must 
be in the buyer’s possession and second, it must have been in the possession of the thief. Third, the 
buyer must not have been negligent about the fact that the good was stolen (simple negligence 
precludes the buyer’s rights). It is up to a buyer to prove he was in good faith, for instance, by 
demanding an original sales contract from the thief. The fourth requirement can be interpreted as 
“something supplementary”, as it is not enough that the previous conditions are satisfied; something 
more is needed to extinguish the property rights of an initial owner. According to Danish case law, 
only when the goods are bought from merchants or when the initial owner stands by and does not 
act to pursue his rights (denoted as passivity), is the buyer able to keep the goods. 
As the description of the various jurisdictions reveals, it is hard to speak of one single European or 
an American rule of law rule. Instead, a whole palette of different legal solutions exists, each having 
its own requirements to allow a buyer to acquire good title to the good. A possible explanation of 
this legal divergence might be that the economic consequences associated with the rule of law have 




4. The Model 
The model considers two risk neutral persons’ strategic interaction: an initial owner of a good and a 
potential buyer. In addition, Nature serves as a random device representing uncertainty in the model 
personified by a thief as well as the police. The sequence of actions is as follows: 
 
1. An initial owner of a good spends an amount of c dollars to protect the good from being stolen 
where [ ]cc ,0∈   is observable. The owner derives utility V, while the good is in her possession 
but only 0 if the good is stolen.  
 
2. Nature determines with probability π that the good is stolen and with probability (1- π) that it is 
not stolen. Thus, we have π(c) where the probability of the good being stolen is increasing in c, 
but decreasing in its second argument, exhibiting a convex relationship. The probability 
distribution of π(c,) is common knowledge. 
 
3. A potential buyer is sure to receive “a take it or leave it” offer to acquire a similar good for a 
price T outside the “normal” market for such goods. The potential purchaser does not know 
whether the good is stolen or not, nor the identity of the initial owner. Assume that the good is 
traded on a fully competitive market where marginal costs of theft equal price T, which for 
simplicity is normalized to 1 (T could in principle equal any positive number without changing 
the structure of the game). 
 
4. The buyer may expend some effort e where { }Hee ,0∈  in order to assess whether the good is 
stolen or not, which is verifiable in court, e.g. by making an inquiry at various public agencies 
asking if such a good has recently been stolen. Assume that u >( T + e), otherwise no trade will 
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occur in the first place. The idea is that he might alternatively want to save these costs and 
maintain ignorance, if e = 0. The model captures the possibility of the buyer refraining from 
expending resources on learning the origin of the good. He might, for example, not ask how old 
the object is, or how the seller knows it is genuine, or how much it has been used - things he 
would like to know about and would ask if he were sure the object was not stolen.  
 
Let Π(c,e) denote the potential buyer’s “posterior” probability or “updated beliefs” that the good 
is stolen given e, which is specified as follows: 
          
     Π(c,e) =    λπ(c)      if e = eH            where      λ ∈ [0, 1/π]      and 
                 =    π(c)        if e =0           
      
These probabilities reflect the idea that a buyer after incurring effort e may revise his initial beliefs 
that the good is stolen, so that the posterior beliefs that the good is stolen may either increase or 
decrease. If the buyer incurs effort e and the new updated beliefs result in an increased probability 
that the good is stolen compared to the initial beliefs, then a buyer is said to be in bad faith i.e λπ(c) 
> π(c),; if, however, the probability decreases, i.e. π(c) > λπ(c), he is said to be in good faith. The 
buyer is also in bad faith, if he deliberately chooses to stay in ignorance, i.e. when e = 0.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that if a buyer accepts an offer to buy a good that might be stolen this 
will stimulate criminal activity, since it becomes easier to sell stolen goods; hence, the market for 
stolen goods becomes more profitable. This will cause more people to enter the market, and as a 
consequence the probability of theft increases in the economy.   
The probability of theft now also depends on a potential buyer’s decision, i.e. d = {accept, reject} 
with the following specification: 
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      π(c,d) =    ϕπ(c,d)    if an offer is accepted                   , where      ϕ ∈ [1, 1/π]      and 
                 =    π(c)         if an offer is rejected                           
      
5. Thereafter, the potential buyer either accepts or rejects the offer. Notice that the buyer may 
decide to buy, even if he is aware that the probability of the good being stolen has increased. 
The buyer enjoys utility U, if he buys the good, otherwise his utility is 0 (equal to his 
reservation utility).  
 
6. If a buyer accepts the thief’s proposal, there is a probability determined by Nature - hence, a risk 
for the buyer that the police will arrive at his home demanding that the good be handed over to 
the initial owner, which is equal to αΠ(c,d), where α∈ [0, 1]. This probability captures the fact 
that the police do not capture all burglars, so with probability (1-α)Π(c,d)), the police will not 
show up. In the former case, the buyer is subjected to a fine for fencing, which equals T. The 
price T paid to the thief is not recovered. 
 
7. With a rule where good faith is legally irrelevant, the good is given back to the initial owner 
irrespective of any good faith and the purchaser’s utility declines to 0, but at the same time the 
initial owner’s utility V is restored. It is assumed that the initial owner can always document that 
she is the rightful owner. In contrast, the good is only handed over to the initial owner under a 











1. Owner spends   2. Prob. of theft    3. Offer to Buyer    4. Posterior Beliefs      5. Accept/reject   6. Police arrive     
        c                          π(c,)                          Price T                    Π(c,)                         π(c,d)                   αΠ(c,d) 
 
                               Time 
 
In the following, I will analyze how the rule of law influences both parties’ incentives in an effort to 
determine which rule of law is most efficient. In doing so, the model will make use of game theory, 
which is particularly suited to modeling strategic interdependency, see e.g. Baird, Gertner and 
Picker (1998) for an interesting and pioneering work on game theory and the law. In order to predict 
how the parties will react, the analysis relies on the notion of subgame perfection that is the 
appropriate equilibrium concept given the formulated model. First, I study a regime where good 
faith plays no role followed by a model where good faith is decisive. The game is solved by 
backward induction, i.e. starting from the terminal nodes and finding the Nash equilibrium in every 
subgame. Notice that even though the subgame perfect equilibrium usually deals with games of 
perfect information, it can easily be extended to cover uncertainty or exogenous events, see e.g. 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) as well as Fudenberg and Tirole (1998).  
 
4.1. A regime where good faith plays no role 
As mentioned, the buyer is not able to keep the good in his possession, even if he is in good faith. 
To solve the game, we consider the terminal node, where the buyer must decide whether to accept 
or reject the offer, given that he has previously made his effort choice. Notice that when the 
potential buyer must decide whether to accept or reject the contract, the effort level is regarded as 
sunk costs. Therefore, it should not enter into the potential buyer’s terminal decision problem, since 
the effort level has already been carried out.  
 18
Figure 1. Game in extensive form when good faith is considered irrelevant 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
In the case where the good is not stolen, depicted in the lower node, it is optimal to accept any 
proposal, since (1-π)(u-T) is strictly positive. In deciding whether to accept or reject an offer when 
the good is stolen (the upper node) the buyer must compare the following pay-offs: the right-hand 
side of equation (1) shows his expected pay-off from accepting the proposal, given that he has 
examined the good.  
  
                           0)(),())(1)(,( =+−−− FTdcTUdc απαπ                                              (1) 
 
Given the assumption that the fine F equals T and T is normalized to 1, we can simplify to obtain 
the following expression. Let  ∆ = (U – 1) denote the difference in value in excess of the price. 
Hence expression (1) can be simplified to: 
 





−=∆                        (2) 
 
If the left-hand side is larger than the fraction on the right-hand side, it is optimal for a buyer to 
accept an offer, since U > T = 1. Therefore, a potential buyer must balance his net utility from the 
good, i.e. delta with the probability that the case will be solved by the police, and he must return the 
good. Expression (2) shows that if alpha decreases, delta decreases. This means that if the risk that 
the police will arrive is reduced, the net utility from being in possession of the good must be lower 
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in order to induce an acceptance. One the other hand, if there is a large risk for the buyer that the 
case will be solved, his net utility from being in possession of the good must be sufficiently high in 
order to induce him to accept an offer. 
However, the relationship is not linear, as demonstrated in Figure 2, where the graph of equation (2) 
is depicted showing an almost exponential relationship: the upper set above the graph corresponds 
to the acceptance region, whereas below the graph a potential buyer should reject an offer.  
 
                                                         [INSERT FIGURE 2]                          
 
When equation (2) holds, it is optimal for a buyer to accept the proposal. The same was true when 
the buyer did not examine the ownership, i.e. when e = 0. 
Now, working backwards, it remains to be determined whether or not the buyer should examine the 
good, given that condition (2) holds. Clearly, it is not rational for a buyer to examine the good, since 
the right-hand side of equation (3) is strictly larger than the left-hand side. 
 
                    { } αϕπαϕπαφπαφπ ),(2)1)(,(),(2)1)(,( dcdcedcdc H −−<−−∆−            (3) 
 
When determining the initial owner’s level of precaution c, it is clear that he knows that a potential 
buyer will always accept an offer; hence criminal activity in the economy is increased, and a buyer 
will never spend any effort on investigating the ownership of the good. In order to analyze what is 
optimal for an owner under the prevailing rule of law, we derive the owner’s expected utility. 




−−+−−−=∈ ϕπαϕπϕαπ       (4) 
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Notice that from the envelope theorem, we can immediately see that the owner’s utility increases in 
alpha, so if the probability that the police solves the case increases, so does the utility of the owner. 
Finding the first order condition yields: 
 
                   01),(),( =−′−′=∂
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c
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1),(               (5) 
        
        
This leads to the first proposition relating to a regime of law, where good faith on the part of a 
buyer is neglected in deciding whether the buyer can keep the good or must return the good to the 
initial owner.                           
 
Proposition I: Provided that condition (2) is satisfied, a regime that does not take into 
consideration the good faith of a buyer of a stolen good will induce a buyer to accept any offer. The 
buyer will avoid spending resources on examining the ownership of the offered good.   
 
4.2 A regime where good faith is pivotal 
In the previous analysis, no attention was paid to whether a buyer was in bad or good faith. This no 
longer holds, since an innocent buyer may now keep the good. The rule of law affects the pay-off 
structure of the game, as the game depicted in Figure 3 shows. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
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Notice how the good faith of a buyer is incorporated in the game using conditional probabilities. 
The game is solved using backward induction starting from the terminal nodes, again recognizing 
that any effort level to examine whether a good is stolen is sunk.  Consider the case where a buyer 
must compare the pay-offs from accepting and rejecting an offer, given that the good is not stolen. 
Since both (1-λπ)(U-T) as well as (1-π)(U-T), i.e. the reservation utility from rejecting the offer, are 
always strictly larger than zero, the potential buyer will always accept an offer in this situation.  
The next step is for a buyer to determine whether he should spend any effort on examining the 
ownership of the good. Recall that when the buyer examines the good, he will get a more precise 
estimate of whether the good is stolen or not, i.e. after incurring costs to verify the ownership, he 
will be more certain of whether the good is stolen or not compared to his initial beliefs. Given that 
λπ < π, the expected utility of seeking to verify the ownership exceeds the utility  of remaining 
ignorant in this situation. Therefore, in the case where Nature selects the lower node, we know, just 
as in the previous case, that a buyer will always accept and thus spend resources to verify the 
ownership.  
When Nature picks the upper node, the situation gets more complicated. The potential buyer must 
now decide whether or not to accept an offer.  
Let λππλπ =<Π )( where λ < 1 denotes the posterior beliefs when a potential buyer is in good 
faith and  ( ))(1)( πλππλπ <Π−=>Π  denotes the posterior beliefs when a potential buyer is in 
bad faith. The left-hand side of equation (6) shows the expected utility when a buyer accepts an 
offer, while the right-hand side equals his reservation utility (again e is regarded as sunk costs). ∆ 
denotes the difference in utility in excess of the price T. 
  
0)1()1()1()1(2 =∆Π−−+Π∆−+Π−−Π∆ ϕαϕααϕαϕ                (6) 
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α                 (7) 
 
By comparing (2) and (7), we are able to determine whether a person under the previous rule of law 
is more likely to accept an offer than under the current rule with good faith. Since equation (2) 
exceeds (7), a person under a rule where good faith is irrelevant must have a higher net utility in 
order to accept a proposal than under a rule that takes into account the buyer’s good faith. The 
reason is that in a situation where good faith is decisive a buyer is provided with stronger incentives 
to accept an offer given that all other parameters are held constant. Consider how the variables, i.e. 
α and π, affect the difference in ∆ since the difference depends on the values of the parameters. 
Only if the parameters are identical under both rules of law is there a strong tendency to accept 
under a rule that allows a buyer in good faith to keep the good. 
It is easy to show that a person who did not verify ownership is willing to accept an offer as long as 
condition (2) holds, i.e. there is no difference between the two rules of law in this situation. 
Now it must be determined whether a person under a good faith rule is willing to examine the 
ownership given that he is prepared to accept an offer. A buyer is indifferent about examining the 
ownership when the following equation holds. 
 




He                                                            (9) 
 
Whether a buyer examines the ownership of a good therefore depends on the costs of effort as well 
as the joint probability that the police solve the case and that the belief that the good is stolen is 
reinforced. If the costs of examining the good are high then the buyer’s net utility of being in 
possession of the good must also be higher in order to induce him to examine its ownership. Notice 
also that if the joint probability of α and Π decreases, then the right side of (9) increases; hence, the 
buyer must value the good more in order to induce him to purchase. The relationship is represented 
in the following graph (which can also be illustrated by constructing various level curves for a given 
value of delta) 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
 
Figure 4 shows that for a given joint probability of α and Π,  a buyer would accept higher costs of 
examining ownership the more he values the good. It was previously shown that under an American 
rule of law, a person would never examine ownership. However, this no longer holds, since 
depending on the variables in expression (9), there are some persons who would prefer to examine 
the good. To illustrate, if delta is 3 and eH is 2 and the joint probability is ½, then the right hand side 
equals 2; in this case, therefore, a buyer derives a higher utility when he examines the good.   
Turning to the owner’s decision problem at the initial node, he knows that there is a higher 
probability of theft under a European rule of law, as expression (2) is higher than expression (7), 
where a potential buyer is indifferent about accepting or rejecting. In other words, a potential buyer 
under a good faith rule could accept a lower net utility of the good from buying than under a rule 
where good faith plays no role. Hence, the probability of theft under a good faith rule is higher 
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compared to a rule where good faith is irrelevant. The difference between conditions (2) and (7) 
determines the increased probability of theft under a good faith rule. Let δ denote this increase in 
the probability of theft under a good faith rule. 
 















α                                (10) 
 
The owner now has this important information, so the relevant probability of theft now becomes πδ 
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Comparing expressions (12) and (5), it is evident that the expression in (12) is negative, but more 
importantly it is less than expression (5). From the convexity assumption, this implies that an owner 
under a good faith rule spends more resources on protecting his property than under a rule which 




Proposition II: Under a rule of law where good faith plays a decisive role in determining property 
rights, there is a positive probability that a potential buyer will incur costs in order to verify 
ownership. Compared to a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, an owner will spend more 
resources on seeking to protect his property from being stolen. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
The model has shown that allowing a person to keep a stolen good, if he is said to be in good faith, 
significantly affects parties’ incentives. More importantly, a rule where good faith is not decisive 
Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, as a potential buyer wastes 
resources on trying to verify ownership and owners of goods incur higher costs in order to deter 
burglars from stealing their property. Not only is the aggregate number of thefts in the economy 
impacted by the rule of law, but the analysis has shown that explicitly incorporating the strategic 
interaction between economic agents reveals that we need to refine our understanding of how the 
two rules of law influence efficiency compared to the initial analysis as proposed by Cooter and 
Ulen (2000). The normative policy implication is, therefore, that jurisdictions that seek to protect an 
innocent buyer should be more reluctant to allow a person in good faith to keep a stolen good.  
It is crucial whether the information available to the third party should lead him to take special care 
to check authority, as seen in the following three cases from the US, in which a bailee improperly 
disposes of goods entrusted to him. In the Delicatessen as Art Gallery Case, a person named Porter 
loaned a painting to von Maker, who hired deli employee Wertz to sell it to Brenner via a dealer 
named Feigen.  Porter sued Feigen for return of the painting, c.f. Porter v. Wertz, 1979). The Court 
decided, however, that Wertz was not an art merchant in the sense of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, and that Feigen ought to have taken the precaution of telephoning one of the numbers Wertz 
gave him, which would have revealed his employment at the delicatessen.    
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Feigen argued that industry practice in the art business was to not inquire into the backgrounds of 
one’s customers.  The Court rejected this, saying, that Feigen’s claim that the failure to look into 
Wertz’s authority to sell the painting was consistent with the practice of the trade does not excuse 
such conduct.  This claim merely confirms the observation of the trial court that `in an industry 
whose transactions cry out for verification of title it is deemed poor practice to probe’.  Indeed, 
commercial indifference to ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works of art.  
Commercial indifference diminishes the integrity and increases the culpability of the apathetic 
merchant (at 258).  
The following case makes much the same point; a third party has a duty to investigate suspicious 
sales as seen in “The New Jersey Diamond Case”.  Wolf consigned a diamond ring to the auction 
company Brand with written instructions not to sell it without permission.  Brand borrowed $4,000 
from Nelson, using the ring as collateral for that loan and for a previously bounced check to Nelson. 
Nelson then purchased the ring from Brand in return for canceling the loan, but without a written 
bill of sale.  He consigned the ring back to Brand, who returned it to Wolf.  The question was 
whether Nelson could recover the ring? c.f. Nelson v. Wolf, 1950. Nelson did not recover the ring in 
this pre-U.C.C. case, because although he did not know all these facts, (a) he knew Brand needed 
money and had bounced a check, (b) he knew Brand had trouble repaying the loan, (c) the lack of a 
bill of sale was suspicious, and (d) he was not an ordinary customer.  In a case three years later, the 
New York Diamond Case,  diamond merchant Harry Winston sent a diamond ring to the auction 
company Brand for examination, with written instructions not to sell it without permission, and 
allowed Brand to display it publicly.  Brand then sold it to Jane Zendman.  The question is whether 
she should own the ring?  c.f. Zendman v. Harry Winston, 1953 (it is the same auction company as 
in the New Jersey Diamond Case!). The Court gave title to Zendman, since she, an ordinary 
customer, had no reason to be suspicious.   
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In addition (important in this pre-U.C.C. case), Winston had allowed public display of the ring 
together with Brand’s other merchandise.  The principal had not taken care, and the third party 
could not, so the principal bore the loss. 
One may argue that civil liability should be taken explicitly into consideration in the analysis. 
However, in many cases it is not possible for a disappointed buyer to receive damages as it depends 
on whether the conditions for imposing liability on the owner are satisfied. Specifically, the buyer 
must prove that the owner acted negligently e.g. by not protecting his assets adequately. It is likely 
that a buyer bearing the onus of proof may fail to establish the matter on a balance of probabilities, 
see e.g. Beale, Bishop and Furmston (1995) p. 941 for a discussion concerning recovery of 
payments of property in English law. Thus under normal circumstances a thief will never be able 
compensate a disappointed buyer due to his limited financial assets.  
Another aspect this analysis does not incorporate is when a buyer becomes the rightful owner due to 
good faith. In such a situation he may resell the good on the legitimate market demanding a higher 
price as he can document that he is the rightful owner. This issue may be a factor that could 
influence the price on the black or grey market, as this is known by the thief but whether this may 
occur depends on the likelihood of the buyer reselling the good.  
Ideally, one would expect to find that in countries where good faith plays a decisive role, persons 
incur higher costs in order to protect their propriety from being stolen compared to jurisdictions, 
where good faith does not serve as an excuse for a buyer keeping the good. However, the empirical 
findings may be difficult to interpret, not only because it is hard to estimate the exact amount people 
spend on protecting their property, but also because criminal activity is influenced by several other  
often latent variables. As a consequence, it might be the case, for example, that people in the US, 
spend more money on protecting their property than in Europe, but that this simply is due to the fact 
that there are other parameters that result in a higher crime rate in the US.  
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Another interesting issue which this analysis does not deal with is how the illegal market for stolen 
goods impacts the legal “normal” market. To illustrate, consider coins. Stamping of coins with the 
royal monogram has always been entrusted to very few selected loyal bodies. This has been done to 
avoid counterfeit coins, e.g. by mixing cheaper metals in gold coins, since counterfeit coins would 
be damaging to the monetary trade and thereby the wealth of the nation. More specifically, 
counterfeit coins or stolen goods may in some situations drive out goods that are sold through the 
normal market. This might result in a partial or complete market breakdown for legal goods 
depending on the rule of law. It seems plausible that a rule of law that protects a buyer in good faith, 
is more likely to experience such market failures, e.g. Akerlof’s (1970) pioneering work on the 
lemons market, where bad used cars drove out good used cars (known as Gresham’s law). 
Parties were assumed to be risk neutral in the analysis. Incorporating risk aversion into the analysis 
seems a natural extension for future work in this area, in particular how the possibility of buying 














Figure 1. The game depicted in extensive form under a rule where good faith is absent. B indicates 
the decision node of a potential buyer and P equals police. 
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Figure 2. The acceptance region and the rejection region 
 


















Figure 3. The game in extensive form where good faith is pivotal. B indicates the decision node of 
a potential buyer and P equals police. Π = π(πλ<π) where  0 <  λ < 1 for good faith and π(πλ>π) = 
1-Π for bad faith. Good faith equals G and bad faith equals B. 
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